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Abstract. The “Ring Learning with Errors” (RLWE) problem was for-
mulated as a variant of the “Learning with Errors” (LWE) problem, with
the purpose of taking advantage of an additional algebraic structure in
the underlying considered lattices; this enables improvements on the ef-
ficiency and cipher expansion on those cryptographic applications which
were previously based on the LWE problem. In Eurocrypt 2010, Lyuba-
shevsky et al. introduced this hardness problem and showed its relation
to some known hardness problems over lattices with a special structure.
In this work, we generalize these results and the problems presented by
Lyubashevsky et al. to the more general case of multivariate rings, high-
lighting the main differences with respect to the security proof for the
RLWE counterpart. This hardness problem is denoted as “Multivariate
Ring Learning with Errors” (m-RLWE or multivariate RLWE) and we
show its relation to hardness problems over the tensor product of ideal
lattices. Additionally, the m-RLWE problem is more adequate than its
univariate version for cryptographic applications dealing with multidi-
mensional structures.
Keywords: Tensor of Number Fields, Lattice Cryptography, Ring Learning
with Errors, Multivariate Rings, Hardness Assumptions
1 Introduction
In recent years, a high number of cryptographic schemes and applications have
been proposed based on the LWE (Learning with Errors) problem. However, in
⋆ This work is partially funded by the Agencia Estatal de Investigacio´n (Spain) and the
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) under projects WINTER (TEC2016-
76409-C2-2-R), by the Xunta de Galicia and the European Union (European Re-
gional Development Fund - ERDF) under projects Agrupacin Estrate´xica Consol-
idada de Galicia accreditation 2016-2019 and Red Tema´tica RedTEIC 2017-2018,
and by the EU H2020 Programme under project WITDOM (project no. 644371).
spite of the versatility of this hardness assumption for developing cryptographic
primitives, the main drawback of the cryptosystems whose security is based
on LWE is their efficiency. Actually, several schemes that allow to perform an
unbounded number of encrypted operations (Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Schemes, FHE) have been devised, but the needed size of the keys and the
required computation times are still too high for practical applications.
In order to alleviate this issue, an algebraic version of the LWE problem
was proposed by Lyubashevsky et al. [15,16]. This hardness assumption, called
ring-LWE, is based on worst-case problems on ideal lattices instead of general
lattices. Although the use of lattices with an additional algebraic structure could
allow for the existence of better attacks, nowadays there are no known attacks
to RLWE that get a substantial advantage with respect to attacks to LWE.3
Hence, the RLWE problem and the analysis of its security reductions to
hardness problems on ideal lattices have enabled the introduction of new crypto-
graphic applications: Brakerski et al. [9,8] proposed several versions of FHE cryp-
tosystems, varying from leveled FHE schemes to the most recent scale-invariant
versions [11,7,6].
Practical applications from Secure Signal Processing (SSP) have made exten-
sive use of homomorphic encryption [4], and especially additive schemes like Pail-
lier’s [21]. However, the Paillier cryptosystem has several drawbacks for practical
implementations, being its two main problems the very high cipher expansion
and the inability to perform multiplications between two encrypted messages.
In order to resolve the first drawback, packing and unpacking steps were
introduced in [29,5]; for the second drawback, several recent works resort to
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) schemes [28] to enable simultane-
ous use of fully encrypted signals. While SHE schemes only allow for a limited
number of encrypted operations, they are more efficient than their Fully Homo-
morphic counterparts. Therefore, if the number of operations that have to be
performed under encryption is known beforehand (this is usually true in many
practical applications), the use of SHE schemes increases the efficiency of the
solution.
Nevertheless, when working with multidimensional signals, both Paillier cryp-
tosystem and RLWE based cryptosystems present a very high cipher expansion
(even after incorporating packing and unpacking techniques). In this context, the
authors [24] introduced some example cryptosystems based on a variant of the
RLWE problem called m-RLWE (multivariate Ring Learning with Errors) that
extends RLWE from the univariate case to the multivariate one. These cryp-
tosystems can be defined by extending to the multivariate case the most typical
RLWE based cryptosystems. They bring about clear advantages in terms of ef-
ficiency and size of the underlying lattice when working with multidimensional
signals, and they allow for packing several signals in only one ciphertext. It is
3 In [18], Albrecht et al. take advantage of the presence of a subfield in the considered
number field which allows them to deal with an easier lattice problem. However,
while this technique allows to have an attack for the overstretched NTRU problem,
the RLWE problem is not affected.
also important to note that some of the contributions of [24] can be adapted
to work with RLWE based cryptosystems considering the tensorial decomposi-
tion in “coprime” cyclotomic fields shown in the work of Lyubashevsky et al.
[17]. This approach only requires to have enough space inside the polynomials
in order to properly store the result of linear convolutions.
However, there are several applications that cannot be easily adapted to
the RLWE case, like those presented in [22,23], because a particular modular
function is needed to enable several usual operations belonging to the field of
Signal Processing. In addition, having the same modular function on several
variables can be a requirement in some cases, and this is not considered in the
work of Lyubashevsky et al. and can only be tackled by resorting to them-RLWE
problem.
While several comparisons between m-RLWE and RLWE have been pre-
sented considering basis-reduction attacks [10,19] and decoding attacks as de-
scribed in [14], a reduction from hardness problems on lattices and a complete
security proof have not been provided yet; this is the main contribution of this
work.
The main objective of this work is to adapt and generalize the techniques
of Lyubashevsky et al. [15] for the RLWE problem and achieve a reduction of
the m-RLWE from hardness problems over ideal lattices, hence giving some new
insights into its hardness. For the sake of completeness, we present a general-
ized version of the multivariate RLWE problem (introduced on [24]) which is
not limited to only work with cyclotomic modular functions of degree power of
two, hence it is possible to have any type of cyclotomic polynomial as modular
function.
1.1 Motivation and Contributions
The ring structure of the RLWE problem allows for defining several crypto-
graphic primitives as for example homomorphic cryptography; providing a ring
homomorphism which enables both addition and multiplication of ciphertexts.
Although we can consider different types of rings, for practical purposes the
most used are those polynomial rings where the modular function is a cyclo-
tomic polynomial with the form 1 + zn being n a power of two.
On the one hand, we can find an efficient implementation of the polyno-
mial operations resorting to radix algorithms of the NTT (Number Theoretic
Transforms). For example one of the most efficient libraries for homomorphic
cryptography [1] deals with highly efficient NTT transforms to perform the dif-
ferent polynomial operations. On the other hand, polynomial operations over
the previous ring correspond to basic blocks used in different practical applica-
tions belonging to Computer Vision and Signal Processing [22], covering linear
convolutions, filterings, linear transforms and many more.
When working with multidimensional structures, as for example videos or im-
ages [24,23], the use of the isomorphism with “prime” cyclotomic rings (see [15,16])
is not valid, because the use of several modular functions with the same form (for
example 1+zn) is required. This is the context where the authors of [24] present
what they called m-RLWE problem as a means to easily deal with encrypted
multidimensional structures.
Hence, our main purpose in this work is to provide a security reduction
from hard lattice problems to the m-RLWE problem. Additionally, we generalize
the m-RLWE variant introduced in [24], considering any type of cyclotomic
polynomial as a modular function (not being restricted to the 1 + zn case).
Our proof follows the techniques introduced by Lyubashevsky et al. [15,16],
adapting and correcting their proof in order to deal with the new inconveniences
that this tensor case introduces. For example, the considered number field tensor
is not even a field (considering (Q[x, y] mod 1 + xn) mod 1 + yn, the polynomial
x+y does not have inverse). We discuss and show how the different peculiarities
of the tensor case can be tackled.
Therefore, our first step is to justify that the main properties which are
required by the techniques from Lyubashevsky et al. are preserved: a) we show
that the ring homomorphism between the finite field tensor and the subspace
H(T ) exists (even though the finite field tensor is not a field); and we define the
Gaussian measures over this tensor space, b) we explain the structure of the
automorphisms which can be used in this tensor case and how to address and
work with them; and c) we explain the use of the CRT (Chinese Remainder
Theorem) and its effects over the corresponding automorphisms.
Additionally, we carefully readapt and revise the tools introduced by Lyuba-
shevsky et al. to the new properties; and those details (for example those which
are involved on the proof of the results presented in Section 3) which need fur-
ther treatment or corrections are consequently explained (see Appendices A,B
and C).
1.2 Structure and notation
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 extends some properties of
cyclotomic number fields to the tensor product case. Section 3 introduces the m-
RLWE problem together with the main theorem and the necessary definitions.
Finally, Section 4 presents the security reductions for m-RLWE along with the
involved theorems, sketching their proof. Appendix A revisits the necessary con-
cepts of algebraic number theory and lattices when they are extended to the
tensor of number fields, while Appendices B and C present the lemmas and
proofs for the main reductions.
We denote matrices and vectors with uppercase and lowercase letters, re-
spectively; 〈a, b〉 represents the scalar product between two vectors a and b.
For a vector x ∈ Cn we define its lp norm as ||x||p =
(∑
i∈[n] |xi|p
)1/p
, where
1 ≤ p < ∞ with p ∈ R, and ||x||∞ = maxi∈[n]|xi|. If p is omitted, we consider
the Euclidean norm.
The set [n] is defined as {1, 2, . . . , n}. We also work with some additional
operators as the tensor product
⊗
and the direct sum
⊕
. When dealing with
number fields (or the corresponding ring of integers), as the tensor product
is always defined over the rational numbers (integer numbers) we ignore the
subscript if there is no ambiguity.
2 Properties of the Tensor Product of Cyclotomic
Number Fields
For the sake of completeness, we discuss why the embeddings, automorphisms
and even the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT, see Appendix A.3) can be
perfectly defined over the tensor of cyclotomic fields and the corresponding ten-
sor ring of integers. Although the three previous concepts are interrelated, we
separately explain their existence in the following sections.
The notation and tools used throughout this discussion are defined in Ap-
pendix A, which introduces the main concepts needed to obtain the security
proofs of the multivariate extension of the RLWE problem, by extending several
of the concepts presented in [15] to our more general case. We refer to this ap-
pendix when needed, but we encourage the reader to go over it before reading
this section.
2.1 Embeddings
We can work with the embedding over the space H (see Appendix A.1) of any
type of cyclotomic field. Of course, as we can decompose a cyclotomic field in the
tensor of power prime cyclotomic fields, it is easily shown that for that particular
case of tensor of cyclotomic fields the embedding exists.
However, in our more general case this relation with cyclotomic fields does
not necessarily hold, so we can not justify the existence of the tensor embedding
by solely resorting to the existence of the embedding in an isomorphic cyclotomic
field.
We can see that the embedding of a cyclotomic field (respectively, its cor-
responding ring of integers or the corresponding reduction modulo q) is equiv-
alent to an invertible linear transformation from Qφ(mi) (respectively, Zφ(mi)
or Z
φ(mi)
q ) to the corresponding subspace Hi ⊆ Cni , where ni = φ(mi) (see
Appendix A).
Now, there are two properties of Kronecker products that allow us to justify
the existence of the embeddings. The first one is that det(A
⊗
B) = det(B
⊗
A)
= (det(A))
n
(det(B))
m
where A and B are square matrices of size n × n and
m × m, respectively. This property states that A⊗B is non singular (and
therefore invertible) if and only if A and B are non singular. The second one
is that (A
⊗
B)
−1
= A−1
⊗
B
−1, which defines this inverse. For more details
about the different properties of the Kronecker product we refer the reader to
[12].
Additionally, we can see that our embedding can be defined as the Kro-
necker product of different invertible linear transformations that correspond to
the different embeddings for each cyclotomic field. Hence, resorting to the prop-
erties of the Kronecker product we can see that there exists the correspond-
ing tensor embedding between the tensor of cyclotomic fields and the subspace
H(T ) =
⊗
i∈[l]Hi (see Appendix A.1).
2.2 Automorphisms and Linear Representation Theory
In order to justify the structure and behaviour of the new automorphisms we
resort to the theory of Linear Representations [27]. First, we introduce the main
concepts needed from this theory, and afterwards, we detail the different auto-
morphisms that we can find.
In general, we consider V as a vector space of dimension d over C and we
define GL(V ) as the group composed of all the isomorphisms of V onto itself.
An element a belonging to GL(V ) can be seen as a linear mapping from V to
V and we denote its inverse as a−1. Analogously, we could think of each linear
mapping as an invertible square matrix A of size d × d whose coefficients are
complex numbers. Hence, we can see that GL(V ) is composed of all the different
invertible square matrices of order d.
Now, if we consider a finite group G, we define a linear representation of G
in V as a homomorphism ρ from G to GL(V ). Considering that the group G
has the composition operation (r, s) → rs for r, s ∈ G, we have the following
property:
ρ(rs) = ρ(r)ρ(s),
where ρ(r)ρ(s) represents the matrix multiplication operation between the two
associated matrices to r and s, respectively. Two important properties are that
when 1 ∈ G, this implies ρ(1) = 1 and ρ(s−1) = ρ(s)−1. Commonly, we consider
V as a representation space (or simply a representation) of G.
Now, we can particularize the previous results to our specific case, for W =
Q (ςmi) ⊂ C (see Appendix A.3). If we consider G = Z∗mi and as the composition
operation we consider the product operation between units of Zmi , we have
the following linear representation ρi : Z
∗
mi → GL(Q(ςmi)) where ρi(Z∗mi) ⊆
GL(Q(ςmi)) is composed of the different automorphisms τk = ρi(k) for k ∈ Z∗mi
such that τk(ςmi) = ς
k
mi , hence having Q(ςmi) as a representation of Z
∗
mi . It is
important to note that the effect of the automorphism τk over the embedding is
a rotation of the coordinates of the subspace Hi, that is, σi(τk(ςmi)) = σik(ςmi),
being i ∈ Z∗mi .
Of course, the linear representation preserves the linear structure and, in this
case, as we have a commutative group Z∗mi , there exists an equivalent represen-
tation such that each square matrix associated to each particular automorphism
can be decomposed as a direct sum of n irreducible representations
⊕
j∈[ni] Vj
(i.e., each irreducible representation for which the only decomposition is the triv-
ial one Vj = 0⊕ Vj). This implies that there exists an isomorphic domain where
we can represent all the elements ofKi in such a way that each different represen-
tation (different automorphism of Ki) of Z
∗
mi can be applied as an element-wise
product over this isomorphic domain, and each different component represents
a different irreducible subrepresentation of V .
Outer tensor product of Linear Representations Consider two groups (G1, ·) and
(G2, ·) and consider the direct product G1×G2 with the following “·” operation:
(s1, s2) · (t1, t2) = (s1 · s2, t1 · t2) where (s1, s2), (t1, t2) ∈ G1 ×G2.
If we now define ρ1 : G1 → GL(V1) and ρ2 : G2 → GL(V2) as linear rep-
resentations of G1 and G2, we can now define a linear representation ρ
1 ⊗ ρ2 :
G1 ×G2 → GL(V1
⊗
V2) by setting:
(
ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) (s1, s2) = ρ1(s1)⊗ ρ2(s2).
This way of dealing with the tensor of different linear representations allows
us to define the different automorphisms of the tensor field K(T ) =
⊗
i∈[l]Ki
in terms of the automorphisms of each Ki. Then, we have for K(T ) the cor-
responding homomorphism with the tensor of linear representations
⊗
i∈[l] ρi :⊕
i∈[l] Z
∗
mi → GL
(⊗
i∈[l]Q(ςmi)
)
, and where each ρi satisfies ρi(ki) = τ
(i)
ki
,
with ki ∈ Z∗mi and being τ
(i)
ki
the corresponding φ(mi) automorphisms of the Ki
number field.
Finally, in order to map the set of
∏
i∈[l] φ(mi) automorphisms
⊗
i∈[l] τ
(i)
ki
with only one index we can consider the relation given in Equation (3) (Ap-
pendix A.1), in such a way that ki ∈ Z∗mi = g(i)([φ(mi)]) and ji = (g(i)(ki))
−1
.
2.3 Chinese Remainder Theorem
In this section we explain why the CRT works over multivariate polynomial
rings and how the use of the previously presented automorphisms affects the
decomposition caused by the CRT.
First, consider R = OKi = Z [ςmi ], the ring of integers of a number field
Q(ςmi) where ςmi is the mi-th primitive root of unity. We know that if we work
with the ideal 〈q〉 = qR and q ∈ Z is a prime, we have the following factorization
〈q〉 = ∏i qei where there are φ(mi)/(ef) different qi of norm qf and we have
e = φ(q′) and f is the minimum natural number that satisfies qf ≡ 1 mod mi/q′
with q′ the largest power of q that divides mi.
For each ideal, we have qj = 〈q, Fj(ςmi)〉 with Φmi(x) =
∏
j (Fj(x))
e
being
the factorization of Φmi(x) modulo q. As explained in [15], when we consider that
q ≡ 1 mod mi, both e and f are equal to 1 and as we have an mi-th primitive
root of unity wi in Zq we see that Φmi(x) =
∏
j∈Z∗mi
(x − wji ). Therefore, we
finally have 〈q〉 =∏j∈Z∗mi qj with qj = 〈q, ςmi − wji 〉. In addition, we know that
we can use the automorphism τ
(i)
k to exchange the contents between two different
prime ideals qj of qR, that is, we can do τ
(i)
k (qj) = qj/k (see Lemma 2.16 in [15]).
Now, resorting to Lemma 9 in Appendix A.3, we have an isomorphism from
Z[ςmi ]/〈q〉 to
⊕
j∈Z∗mi
Z[ςmi ]/〈q, ςmi − wji 〉, that is in fact also isomorphic to
Z
φ(mi)
q .
Multivariate extension We can see the multivariate case R =
⊗
i∈[l]OKi as the
tensor product between the previously considered univariate rings, that is, we
have
⊗
i∈[l] Z[ςmi ]/〈q〉 where q has to satisfy q ≡ 1 mod mi for all i ∈ [l]. Now,
we know that it is isomorphic to the tensor product of the respective direct
sum in terms of the different prime ideals
⊗
i∈[l]
(⊕
j∈Z∗mi
Z[ςmi ]/〈q, ςmi − wji 〉
)
where we know that the tensor and direct product commute, therefore having
⊕
j∈[
∏
i∈[l] φ(mi)]
(⊗
k∈[l] Z[ςmk ]/〈q, ςmk − wjkk 〉
)
,
where the mapping between the set {j1, . . . , jl} and j is defined by Equation (3).
This ring is in fact isomorphic to Z
∏
i∈[l] φ(mi)
q .
Resorting to the ring isomorphism ςmi → xi for i ∈ [l] we have the expression⊕
i∈[l],ji∈Z∗mi
Zq [x1, . . . , xl] /〈x1−wj11 , . . . , xl−wjll 〉. Now, thanks to the mapping
introduced in Equation (3), we consider qj = qj1,...,jl = 〈x1 − wj11 , . . . , xl − wjll 〉
with j ∈
[∏
i∈[l] φ(mi)
]
. First, it can be easily shown that each qj is an ideal
and, as there is an isomorphism from Zq[x1, . . . , xl]/qj to the finite field Zq, qj
is a maximal ideal and also a prime ideal because every maximal ideal over a
ring is also a prime ideal.
In order to show that all the qj are comaximal ideals we have the following
reductio ad absurdum argument: consider two different maximal ideals qj and qk
with k 6= j; by definition, qk+qj is also an ideal; we have three possible cases: a)
qk + qj = qk, b) qk + qj = qj and c) there is another maximal ideal qk + qj. The
first two cases are not true because qk and qj are different, and the third case is
impossible because each ideal is maximal, hence having qk+ qj = Zq[x1, . . . , xl],
which is the definition of comaximal ideals.
Then, knowing that we have a set of comaximal ideals qj for j ∈
[∏
i∈[l] φ(mi)
]
,
we can use Lemma 9 in Appendix A.3 to show that there exists an isomorphism
from Zq[x1, . . . , xl]/〈Φm1(x1), . . . , Φml(xl)〉 to
⊕
j∈[∏i∈[l] φ(mi)] (Zq[x1, . . . , xl]/qj),
that is, we can compute the corresponding CRT, and the rest of the properties
discussed in Appendix A.3 also apply.
Now, we can present a similar result to Lemma 2.16 in [15], but adapted to
our more general case:
Lemma 1 (Lyubashevsky et al. [15] Lemma 2.16). For any qj = qj1,...,jl and
qj′ = qj′1,...,j′l (by Equation (3)), we have a linear representation or automor-
phism ⊗i∈[l]ρi (k1, . . . , kl) = ⊗i∈[l]τ(i)ki where ki ∈ Z∗mi satisfies ⊗i∈[l]τ
(i)
ki
(qj) =
qj′ .
3 multivariate Ring-LWE
We define the multivariate RLWE distribution as a generalization of the RLWE
distribution where the involved polynomial rings can have several indetermi-
nates. The m-RLWE distribution is parameterized by a tensor of number fields
K(T ) =
⊗
i∈[l]Ki where each Ki is a cyclotomic number field; not necessarily
being all of them different. We also consider the ring R as the tensor of the cor-
responding ring of integers OKi , that is, R =
⊗
i∈[l]OKi and an integer modulus
q ≥ 2. We denote Jq for J /qJ where J is a fractional ideal in K(T ). Let R∨ be
the dual fractional ideal of R and T = K(T ),R/R
∨.4
Definition 1 (Multivariate ring LWE distribution). For s ∈ R∨q and an error
distribution ψ over K(T ),R, a sample from the m-RLWE distribution As,ψ over
Rq × T is generated by a ← Rq uniformly at random, e ← ψ, and outputting
(a, b = (a · s)/q + e mod R∨).
Definition 2 (Multivariate ring LWE, Search). Let Ψ be a family of distributions
over K(T ),R. m-RLWEq,Ψ denotes the search version of the m-RLWE problem. It
is defined as follows: given access to arbitrarily many independent samples from
As,Ψ for some arbitrary s ∈ R∨q and ψ ∈ Ψ , find s.
Next, we include the decision version of the m-RLWE problem:
Definition 3 (Multivariate ring LWE, Average-Case Decision). Let Υ be a dis-
tribution over a family of error distributions, each over K(T ),R. The average-case
decision version of the m-RLWE problem, denoted m-R-DLWEq,Υ , is to distin-
guish with nonnegligible advantage between arbitrarily many independent samples
from As,ψ, for a random choice of (s, ψ)← U(R∨q ) × Υ ,5 and the same number
of uniformly random and independent samples from Rq × T.
For an asymptotic treatment of the m-RLWE problems, we let K(T ) come
from an infinite sequence of tensors of number fields K = {K(T ),n} of increasing
dimension n (n is the number of basis elements that form the integral basis),
and let q, Ψ , and Υ depend on n as well.
Error distributions We include here two definitions about the error distribu-
tions to achieve the reductions for the search version of multivariate ring-LWE
(Definition 4) and for the hardness result for the average-case decision prob-
lem (Definition 5). We refer the reader to Appendices A.2 and A.3 for further
information about Gaussian distributions over a tensor field.
Definition 4 (extension of Lyubashevsky et al. [15], Definition 3.4). For a pos-
itive real α > 0, the family Ψ≤α is the set of all elliptical Gaussian distributions
Dr (over K(T ),R) where each parameter ri ≤ α with i ∈ [n].
Definition 5 (extension of Lyubashevsky et al. [15], Definition 3.5). Let K(T ) =⊗
i∈[l]Ki where the Ki are the mi-th cyclotomic number field having degree ni =
φ(mi). For a positive real α > 0, a distribution sampled from Υα is given by an
elliptical Gaussian distribution Dr (over K(T ),R) whose parameters are ri,j =
ri,j+ni/2 (see Appendix A.2) and each rj with j ∈ [n] satisfies r2j = α2(1+
√
nxj),
4 K(T ),R is defined as K(T )
⊗
Q
R. For more details we refer the reader to Appendix
A.3.
5 U(R∨q ) represents the uniform distribution over R
∨
q
where whenever we have ri and rj such that i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j, the corresponding
xi and xj are chosen independently from the distribution Γ (2, 1).
Our main theorem is obtained by combining the theorems from Sections 4.1
and 4.2 (see Appendix A.3 for the definitions of lattice hardness problems; i.e.,
SVP and SIVP):
Theorem 1 (Extended version tom-RLWE of Lyubashevsky et al. [15] Theorem
3.6 ). Let K(T ) =
⊗
i∈[l]Ki be the tensor product of l cyclotomic fields of dimen-
sion ni = φ(mi) each, and R =
⊗
i∈[l]OKi the tensor of their corresponding ring
of integers. Let α <
√
log n/n, and let q = q(n) ≥ 2, q ≡ 1 mod mi, for all i,
be a poly(n)-bounded prime such that αq ≥ ω(√logn), where ω(f(n)) denotes a
function that asymptotically grows faster than f(n). Then, there is a polynomial-
time quantum reduction from O˜(√n/α)-approximate SIVP (or SVP) on (tensor)
ideal lattices in K(T ) to m-R-DLWEq,Υα . Alternatively, for any l ≥ 1, we can
replace the target problem by the problem of solving m-R-DLWEq,Dξ given only
l samples, where ξ = α · (nl/ lognl)1/4.
Discretizing the b component In practical applications [24], we usually deal with
a version of the hardness problem where the error distribution is discrete. That
is, instead of working with an error distribution ψ over K(T ),R, we have to deal
with an m-RLWE distribution As,χ where χ is a discrete error distribution over
R∨ therefore resulting in an element b that belongs to R∨q .
Here, we present a variant of Definition 3 that we call m-R-DLWEq,χ where
we have a given number of samples from χ instead of ψ, and we have the problem
of distinguishing between samples from As,χ and uniform samples from Rq×R∨q .
In order to guarantee the hardness of the discrete version we have to follow
the procedure described in [17]. We include the main lemmas that explain the
hardness of the discrete version together with some relevant explanations about
the considerations needed for our multivariate case.
The following lemma states that if m-R-DLWEq,ψ is hard with l samples,
then m-R-DLWEq,χ is also hard for the same number of samples, with χ the
distribution obtained from ⌊p · ψ⌉w+pR∨ and p and q coprime integers.
Lemma 2 (Extended version of Lemma 2.23 in [17]). Let p and q coprime
integers, and ⌊·⌉ a valid discretization to cosets of pR∨. There exists an efficient
transformation that on input w ∈ R∨p and a pair in (a′, b′) ∈ Rq ×K(T ),R/qR∨
outputs (a = pa′ mod qR, b) ∈ Rq × R∨q with the following considerations: if the
input pair is uniformly distributed then so is the output pair; and if the input pair
is distributed according to the multivariate ring-LWE distribution As,ψ for some
unknown s ∈ R∨ and distribution ψ over K(T ),R, then the output is distributed
according to As,χ where we have that χ = ⌊p · ψ⌉w+pR∨ .
In practical applications [24] it is also common to have two additional changes
with respect to the previous definition of the average-case decision version: a)
instead of sampling a and s from Rq and R
∨
q respectively, both are usually
sampled from Rq. In general, we are in a different situation when we do this,
however the works which consider that s belongs to Rq deal with a particular
type of cyclotomic fields where mi is a power of two. It can be shown that for
this particular type of cyclotomic fields both definitions are equivalent, so it
does not introduce additional drawbacks to the hardness reduction; b) instead
of a uniform s, s is chosen from the error distribution (this is known as “normal
form”) in practical cases, hence having a short secret key.
In order to show that the variant with short error (R-DLWEq,χ) is as hard
as the original R-DLWEq,ψ , the proof of Lyubashevsky et al. [17] follows the
technique of [2]. Their results can be adapted to our more general case, so we
include below the relevant lemma:
Lemma 3 (Extended version of Lemma 2.24 in [17]). Let p and q be positive
coprime integers, ⌊·⌉ be a valid discretization to cosets of pR∨, and w be an
arbitrary element in R∨p . If m-R-DLWEq,ψ is hard given some number l of sam-
ples, then so is the variant of m-R-DLWEq,χ where the secret is sampled from
χ = ⌊p · ψ⌉w+pR∨ , given l − 1 samples.
The proof of the previous lemma relies on how to use an oracle of the second
problem to solve the first one. The difference with respect the proof presented
in [17] lies on how to compute the fraction of invertible elements of Rq. In order
to resolve this, we resort to the following claim about cyclotomic fields:
Claim (Claim 2.25 in [17]). Consider the m-th cyclotomic field of degree n =
φ(m) for some m ≥ 2. Then for any q ≥ 2, the fraction of invertible elements in
Rq is at least 1/poly (n, log q).
In our case, we work with the tensor of cyclotomic fields K(T ) =
⊗
i∈[l]Ki;
for each cyclotomic field Ki, the fraction of irreducible elements in OKi/〈q〉 is at
least 1/poly (φ(mi), log q) with q ≥ 2 and with q ≡ 1 mod mi for all i ∈ [l]. When
working in the tensor of the different polynomial rings over Zq, if an element
is invertible, the corresponding elements belonging to each OKi must be invert-
ible too (same explanation as in Kronecker product of matrices, Section 2.1).
Then, the fraction of invertible elements in Rq =
⊗
i∈[l]OKi/〈q〉 is at least the
product of the fractions of each ring of integers 1/poly
(∏
i∈[l] φ(mi), log q
)
=
1/poly (n, log q), and Lemma 3 follows.
4 Proof sketch of the hardness of the multivariate Ring
Learning with Errors problem
This section introduces the main theorems together with their proofs for the
different reductions of the m-RLWE problem. The proof can be divided in two
main parts, described in the following paragraphs.
Hardness Search-LWE The first part achieves a quantum reduction from ap-
proximate SVP on ideal lattices over R to the search version of m-RLWE. The
goal of the search version is to recover the secret key s. The procedure follows
the techniques considered by Lyubashevsky et al. [15] and Regev [26].
The main contribution here is to extend their tools to the more general case of
the tensor of cyclotomic fields (or even the tensor of more general fields). For this
purpose, we use the iterative quantum reduction for general lattices of Regev
together with the corresponding tools that we can find on algebraic number
theory; i.e., the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the canonical embedding that
were used by Lyubashevsky et al. but adapted to our multivariate case.
Pseudorandomness of m-RLWE The main purpose of this part is to show that
them-RLWE distribution is pseudorandom, that is, there exists a reduction from
the search problem, discussed in the first part, to the decision variant of the hard-
ness problem. We present two different versions of the hardness problem: one for
the decision problem with a nonspherical distribution in the canonical embed-
ding, and another one for the decision problem with a spherical distribution but
with a bounded number of samples. Additionally, when assuming the hardness
of the search problem with a fixed spherical Gaussian error distribution, we also
have hardness of the decision version with the same error distribution.
Again, the main contribution of our work relies on proving that the multi-
variate samples following them-RLWE distribution are pseudorandom, therefore
generalizing the results of [15] to the case of multivariate elements. The main
needed properties are those related to the decomposition of 〈q〉 into n prime ide-
als and the use of the automorphisms allowing us to permute the prime ideals.
4.1 Hardness Search-LWE
For this section, let K(T ) =
⊗
i∈[l]Ki of degree n denote the tensor of l arbitrary
number fields and R =
⊗
i∈[l]OKi the corresponding tensor of rings of integers.
The results can be applied to an arbitrary number field, so in this section we do
not have to consider the specific case of cyclotomic fields.
Theorem 2 (Extended Theorem 4.1 of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). Let K(T ) be
a tensor of arbitrary number fields with degree ni each and R the tensor of the
corresponding ring of integers. Let α = α(n) > 0, and let q = q(n) ≥ 2 be such
that αq ≥ 2 · ω(√logn), where ω(f(n)) denotes a function that asymptotically
grows faster than f(n). For some negligible ǫ = ǫ(n), there is a probabilistic
polynomial-time quantum reduction from K(T )-DGSγ to m-R-LWEq,Ψ≤α , where
γ = max {ηǫ(I) · (
√
2/α) · ω(√logn),√2n/λ1(I∨)}
Here K(T )-DGSγ denotes the discrete Gaussian sampling problem [26,15]
where given an ideal I in K(T ) and a number s ≥ γ = γ(I), we have to generate
samples from DI,s. The proof of this theorem is shown in Appendix B.
Regev [26] showed that we have easy reductions from standard lattice prob-
lems to DGS. As Lyubashevsky et al. [15] assert, combining lemmas 4 and 6
we have ηǫ(I) ≤ λn(I) · ω(
√
logn) (see Appendix A.2 for the definition of the
smoothing parameter ηǫ) for any fractional ideal I and negligible ǫ(n), and we
also have that samples from DI,γ have length at most γ
√
n with overwhelming
probability. This is also valid in our case.
Analogously, an oracle for K(T )-DGSγ with γ = ηǫ(I) · O˜(1/α) implies an
oracle for O˜(√n/α)-approximate SIVP on ideal lattices in the tensor field K(T ).
When each Ki is a cyclotomic field, we also have λn(I) = λ1(I) for any
fractional ideal I, as for each shortest nonzero v ∈ I, if we multiply it by
different combinations of ςe1−1m1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ςel−1ml with ei ∈ [φ(mi)], it yields a total of
n independent elements of equal length, that is, we have an oracle for O˜(√n/α)-
approximate SVP.
It is important to note that as the error distribution is added modulo R∨ in
the definition of m-RLWE, the condition α < ηǫ(R
∨) must be satisfied for all
negligible ǫ(n) for the problem to be solvable.
4.2 Pseudorandomness of m-RLWE
In this section, we particularize again K(T ) =
⊗
i∈[l]Ki and R =
⊗
i∈[l]OKi
for the cyclotomic case Ki = Q(ςmi) with ςmi a primitive mi-th root of unity.
We also consider the prime q ≡ 1 mod mi for all i ∈ [l] and we have that
it is poly(n)-bounded, where n =
∏
i∈[l] φ(mi) is the degree of the considered
multivariate polynomials.
We recall thatK(T ) has a set of n different automorphisms τj with j ∈ [n] (see
Equation (3)) and when working over q, we have that 〈q〉 =∏i∈[n] qi splits into a
product of prime ideals qi where the automorphisms satisfy ⊗i∈[l]τ(i)ki (qj) = qj′
for any prime ideals qj, qj′ where ki ∈ Z∗mi and j, j′ ∈ [n] (for more details we
refer the reader to Appendix A).
In the following we present the main theorems about the different reductions
from the search version of m-RLWE (see Definition 2 and Theorem 2 about the
reduction over worst-case lattice problems) to the average-case decision problem
m-R-DLWE (see Definition 3).
Theorem 3 (Extended Theorem 5.1 of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). Let R and
q be as shown previously and let αq ≥ ηǫ (R∨) for some negligible ǫ = ǫ(n).
Then, there is a randomized polynomial-time reduction from m-R-LWEq,Ψ≤α to
m-R-DLWEq,Υα .
In order to prove the previous theorem we need four more reductions that
are described in the following discussion.
LWEq,Ψ
Automorphisms−−−−−−−−−−→
Lemma 16
qi-LWEq,Ψ
Search/Decision−−−−−−−−−−−→
Lemma 18
WDLWEiq,Ψ
WDLWEiq,Ψ
Worst/Average−−−−−−−−−−→
Lemma 19
DLWEiq,Υ
Hybrid−−−−−−−−→
Lemma 20
DLWEq,Υ
The details of the proof follow the steps of Lyubashevsky et al. [15], which,
conversely, follows similar steps to the reductions of [26], the main point being
the use of the automorphisms to recover the secret key s when only knowing the
secret key relative to one prime ideal qi (Lemma 16).
An additional needed step is the randomization of the error distribution
(sampled from Υ ) such that the error is invariant under the different field au-
tomorphisms (see Lemma 19) because the different ψ ∈ Ψ≤α are not necessarily
invariant under the field automorphisms. Equivalently, if this reduction random-
izing the error distribution is not desirable, we can apply a bound on the number
of samples for considering a result about pseudorandomness of m-RLWE with a
fixed spherical noise distribution.
Theorem 4 (Extended Theorem 5.2 of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). Let R, q and
α be as in Theorem 3 and let l ≥ 1. There is a randomized polynomial-time
reduction from solving m-R-LWEq,Ψ≤α to solving m-R-DLWEq,Dξ given only l
samples, where ξ = α · (nl/ log (nl))1/4.
In this case, we have a similar reduction to the one in Theorem 3 but con-
sidering a different lemma (Lemma 22 instead of Lemma 19 in one of the steps).
WDLWEiq,Ψ
Worst/Average−−−−−−−−−−→
Lemma 22
DLWEiq,Dξ
Hybrid−−−−−−−−→
Lemma 20
DLWEq,Dξ
It is interesting to note that if we assume hardness of the search version with
a spherical error distribution LWEq,Dξ , then we also have a reduction for the
pseudorandomness with a spherical error, but simplifying Lemma 19 instead of
resorting to sampling from the Υ distribution.
Theorem 5 (Extended Theorem 5.3 of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). Let R, q and
α be as in Theorem 3. There exists a randomized polynomial-time reduction from
solving m-R-LWEq,Dα to solving m-R-DLWEq,Dα .
The detailed proofs for these three theorems along with the lemmas involved
in the security reductions for m-RLWE are included in Appendix C.
5 Conclusions
In this work we have presented a multivariate version of the well-known Ring
Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem to a multivariate version working over
the tensor product of number fields, denoted m-RLWE, which finds application
in secure signal processing scenarios. We have adapted and generalized the tech-
niques of Lyubashevsky et al. [15] to the tensor product of number fields and
achieved a reduction of the m-RLWE problem to hardness problems over ideal
lattices, hence giving some new insights into its security.
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A Fundamental Concepts of Lattices and Algebraic
Number Theory
This appendix presents the fundamental concepts of lattices and algebraic num-
ber theory and extends them to the more general case of a tensor of number
fields on which m-RLWE is mainly based.
A.1 The Space H(T ) =
⊗
i
Hi
When working with cyclotomic fields, it is useful to work with the subspace
H ⊆ Rs1×C2s2 with s1+2s2 = n, where the tuple (s1, s2) is called the signature
of the number field, and H satisfies:
H = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rs1 × C2s2 such that xs1+s2+j = x¯s1+j , ∀j ∈ [s2]} ⊆ Cn
(1)
An orthonormal basis {hj}j∈[n] for H can be defined as:
hj =


ej if j ∈ [s1]
1√
2
(ej + ej+s2 ) if s1 < j ≤ s1 + s2√−1√
2
(ej−s2 − ej) if s1 + s2 < j ≤ s1 + 2s2
(2)
where the vectors ej are the vectors of the standard basis in R
n.
Finally, each element a =
∑
j∈[n] ajhj ∈ H (where all aj ∈ R) has its own lp
norm defined as in Section 1.2.
For our purposes, we define the subspace H(T ) =
⊗
i∈[l]Hi as the tensor
product of l subspaces Hi, each equivalent to the subspaces previously intro-
duced.
In particular, if we see each element belonging to each Hi as a different
linear transformation, we are actually working with the Kronecker product of the
different subspaces Hi. Hence, the new basis will be the result of the Kronecker
product of the original basis of each Hi, therefore having an orthonormal basis
for H(T ) given by {hj}j∈[n], where we can define the following mapping for j
j = 1 +
∑
i∈[l]
(ji − 1)
∏
d∈[i]
nd−1, (3)
being hj =
⊗
i∈[l] h
(i)
ji
the new form of the basis vectors, and where n =
∏
i∈[l] ni
and each {h(i)ji }ji∈[ni] is the corresponding orthonormal basis of each Hi ⊆ Cni
for i ∈ [l] and n0 = 1. This expression is used when indexing the embeddings
(see Appendix A.3) and automorphisms (see Section 2) that can be performed
in a tensor field.
A.2 Lattice background
A lattice in our multivariate setting is defined as an additive subgroup of H(T ) =⊗
i∈[l]Hi. We only work with lattices of full rank, which are obtained as the set
of all integer linear combinations of a set of n linear independent basis vectors
B = {b1, . . . , bn} ⊂ H(T ):6
Λ = L(B) =


∑
i∈[n]
zibi such that z ∈ Zn

 (4)
The minimum distance λ1(Λ) of a lattice Λ for the norm ||.|| is given with the
length of the shortest nonzero lattice vector, that is, λ1(Λ) = minx∈Λ/x 6=0||x||.
The dual lattice of Λ ⊂ H(T ) is defined as Λ∗ = {x ∈ H(T ) such that 〈Λ,x〉 ⊆
Z} and it satisfies (Λ∗)∗ = Λ.
Gaussian Measures The results explained in [15] for nonspherical Gaussian dis-
tributions can be extended to our case. So we repeat here some of the concepts
presented for Gaussian measures but adapted to our tensor setting.
We consider the Gaussian function ρr : H → (0, 1] with r > 0 as ρr(x) =
exp(−π||x||2/r2). A continuous Gaussian probability distribution can be ob-
tained by normalizing the previous function in such a way that we have Dr with
6 As we work with the Kronecker product of a basis for each subspace Hi, we can
exploit the properties of the Kronecker product to find the corresponding basis.
a density function r−nρr(x). When we extend this to the non spherical Gaussian
case, we consider the vector r =
⊗
i∈[l] ri where r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ (R+)
n
or also
each ri = (ri,1, . . . , ri,ni) ∈ (R+)ni and whose components satisfy ri,j+s1+s2 =
ri,j+s1 . Finally, a sample from Dr is given by
∑
i∈[n] xihi where xj =
∏
i∈[l] x
(i)
ji
and each xj is drawn independently from the Gaussian distribution Drj over
R; being rj equal to
∏
i∈[l] ri,ji and using the mapping between {j}j∈[n] and
{ji}ji∈[ni],i∈[l] given by equation (3).
Next, we include several results about the Gaussian distributions that are
needed for this work.
Definition 6 (Smoothing parameter). The smoothing parameter ηǫ(Λ) for a
lattice Λ and real ǫ > 0 is defined as the smallest r such that ρ1/r(Λ
∗\{0}) ≤ ǫ.
In addition, several important lemmas from [15], [20], [26] and [3] about the
relation between the smoothing parameter and properties of lattices are included
below.
Lemma 4 (Lyubashevsky et al. [15] Lemma 2.2, Micciancio and Regev [20]
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, we have η2−2n(Λ) ≤√
n/λ1(Λ
∗) and ηǫ(Λ) ≤
√
ln(n/ǫ)λn(Λ) for all 0 < ǫ < 1.
Lemma 5 (Lyubashevsky et al. [15] Lemma 2.3, Micciancio and Regev [20]
Lemma 4.1, Regev [26] Claim 3.8). For any lattice Λ, ǫ > 0, r ≥ ηǫ(Λ), and c ∈
H(T ), the statistical distance
7 between (Dr+c) mod Λ and the uniform distribu-
tion modulo Λ is at most ǫ/2. Alternatively, we have ρr(Λ+ c) ∈
[
1−ǫ
1+ǫ , 1
]
ρr(Λ).
Let a lattice Λ, a point u ∈ H(T ) and r > 0 with r ∈ R, the discrete
Gaussian probability distribution over Λ + u with parameter r can be defined
as DΛ+u,r(x) =
ρr(x)
ρr(Λ+u)
for all x ∈ Λ+ u.
Lemma 6 (Banaszczyk [3], Lemma 1.5 (i)). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ
and r > 0, a sample point from DΛ,r has Euclidean norm at most r
√
n, except
with probability at most 2−2n.
Lemma 7 (Regev [26]). : Let Λ be a lattice, let u ∈ H(T ) be any vector, and let
r, s > 0 be reals. Assume that 1/
√
1/r2 + 1/s2 ≥ ηǫ(Λ) for some ǫ < 1/2. Con-
sider the continuous distribution Y on H(T ) obtained by sampling from DΛ+u,r
and then adding an element drawn independently from Ds. Then, the statistical
distance between Y and D√r2+s2 is at most 4ǫ.
A.3 Algebraic Number Theory background
This appendix covers the main concepts related to number fields that are used
in the papers [15] and [17]; we highlight the theorems and lemmas that are
7 The statistical distance ∆(X,Y ) between two continuous random variables X and
Y over Rn with probability density functions T1 and T2 is defined as ∆(X,Y ) =
1
2
∫
Rn
|T1(r)− T2(r)|dr. For more details we refer the reader to [20] and [26].
fundamental to our proof, so even when they have already been presented in the
literature, we include them here for completeness and to make our work self-
contained. We also particularize some of the results to the case of cyclotomic
fields; for further details, we refer the reader to the previous cited papers or to
any introductory book on the subject [13].
The concepts about algebraic number theory presented here are necessary to
show which are the main changes needed to extend the proof of Lyubashevsky et
al. to the generic multidimensional case (not only coprime factors), as explained
in Section 4.
Number fields A number field is defined as a field extension K = Q(ς) where
the element ς is incorporated to the field of rationals. This element ς satisfies
f(ς) = 0 for an irreducible polynomial f(x) ∈ Q[x] denoted minimal polynomial
of ς . The degree n of a number field is the degree of its minimal polynomial.
We can also see the number field K as an n-dimensional vector space over
Q where {1, ς, . . . , ςn−1} is called the power basis of the field K. Of course, we
have an isomorphism between K and Q [x] /f(x).
In this work, we have a special interest on cyclotomic fields, which are those
fields where ς = ςm (for some natural number m) is an m-th primitive root
of unity and the minimal polynomial of ςm is the m-th cyclotomic polynomial
Φm(x) =
∏
i∈Z∗m(x − ω
i
m) ∈ Z [x], where ωm ∈ C is any primitive m-th complex
root of unity (for example ωm = e
2π
√−1/m). It is important to note that the
different powers ωim of Φm(x) are the m-th roots of unity in C and that the
degree of Φm(x) is n = φ(m), where φ(m) is the Euler’s totient function.
In general, there is no bound on the number of elements that can be added,
so we could have K = Q(ςm1 , . . . , ςml), that is isomorphic to the cyclotomic field
Q(ςm) =
⊗
i∈[l]Q(ςmi) when m =
∏
i∈[l]mi has a prime-power decomposition
and each ςmi is a mi-th primitive root of unity (See [17]).
Therefore, we can see our scheme as a generalization of the previous tensor
product of cyclotomic fields, where we can have a non prime tensor decomposi-
tion ofm (the same power cyclotomic can appear several times in the expression).
Embeddings and Geometry Here, we describe the embeddings that can be
defined in a general number field together with the canonical geometry that we
can consider thanks to these embeddings.
A number field K = Q(ς) of degree n has exactly n embeddings σi : K →
C where each of these embeddings maps ς to a different complex root of its
minimal polynomial f . The number of real embeddings is denoted s1 and the
number of pairs of complex embeddings is denoted by s2 (each complex root has
a conjugate), so we have n = s1 +2s2 (the pair (s1, s2) is called the signature of
the number field).
The canonical embedding is defined as σ : K → Rs1 × C2s2 where σ(x) =
(σ1(x), . . . , σn(x))
T
. We let {σi} with i = 1, . . . , s1 be the real embeddings and
σs1+s2+j = σ¯s1+j with j = 0, . . . , s2 − 1 be the complex embeddings.
For our purposes it is useful to redefine the embedding of
⊗
i∈[l]Ki as in [17]
with the corresponding reordering of the σi(x). Therefore, we have σ(⊗i∈[l]ai) =
⊗i∈[l]σ(i)(ai) and instead of considering the signature (s1, s2), each σ(i) is defined
as σ(i) : Ki → CZ
∗
mi (for the particular case of cyclotomic fields with mi > 2
there are no real roots, so we have s1 = 0).
Now, we have a bijective map g(i) : [φ(mi)]→ Z∗mi that allows us to represent
each embedding with a new set of indices as
σ(i)(x) =
(
σ
(i)
g(i)(1)
(x), . . . , σ
(i)
g(i)(φ(mi))
(x)
)T
in such a way that if ki ∈ Z∗mi = g(i)([φ(mi)]), the relation between the complex
conjugates is σ
(i)
ki
= σ¯
(i)
mi−ki . Finally, the tensoring of the different embeddings
⊗i∈[l]σ(i)(ai) reduces over H(T ) in a Kronecker product of the images obtained
in each different subspace Hi.
By virtue of this canonical embedding, there exists a ring homomorphism
from
⊗
i∈[l]Ki to
⊗
i∈[l]Hi where eachHi ⊂ CZ
∗
mi , and where multiplication and
addition are element-wise. Thanks to this, we can define geometric norms over⊗
i∈[l]Ki considering the presented tensor subspace H(T ). Therefore, for any x ∈
K(T ) and any p ∈ [1,∞], we consider ||x||p = ||σ(x)||p =
(∑
j∈[n] |σj(x)|p
)1/p
with p <∞ and maxj∈[n]|σj(x)| for p =∞, where each σj(x) =
∏
i∈[l] σ
(i)
g(i)(ji)
(x)
following the mapping indicated in Equation (3), and ji ∈ [φ(mi)], j ∈ [n] such
that n =
∏
i∈[l] φ(mi) with φ(mi) = ni.
Analogously, the canonical embedding allows us to work with the Gaussian
distribution Dr with r ∈ (R+)n over
⊗
iHi as a distribution over
⊗
iKi. Actu-
ally, the distribution Dr is over K(T ),R = K(T )
⊗
QR which is also isomorphic
to H(T ) as a real vector space.
8 However, it is more helpful to ignore the distinc-
tion between K(T ) and K(T ),R and to approximate the latter by the former using
enough precision (in order to represent real numbers with rational numbers).
Trace and Norm Here we present the basic concepts of trace and norm over
number fields that were proposed in previous works. Section 2 highlights which
are the changes needed and how we can work with them when we have the tensor
product of non coprime cyclotomic fields.
The trace Tr = TrK/Q : K → Q and norm N = NK/Q : K → Q are defined
as:
Tr(x) =
∑
i∈[n]
σi(x), N(x) =
∏
i∈[n]
σi(x). (5)
In addition, the trace is a linear function in Q because Tr(a + b) = Tr(a) +
Tr(b) and Tr(ca) = cTr(a) for all a, b ∈ K and c ∈ Q. It is also important to
note that Tr(a · b) =∑i σi(a)σi(b).
8 We will use K(T ) instead of K(T ),R unless the distinction is relevant.
Even though we will do more emphasis later, we note that when working with
tensor products K(T ) =
⊗
iKi, resorting to the fact that σ(⊗iai) = ⊗iσ(i)(ai)
the corresponding trace satisfies TrK(T )/Q(⊗iai) =
∏
i TrKi/Q(ai).
Tensor Ring of Integers and its Ideals This appendix revises some basic
properties of the ring of integers of a number field and its ideals. Although we
are considering cyclotomic number fields Ki = Q(ςmi), these results apply to
more general number fields. The ring of integers of a number field is denoted
OKi and it is defined as the set of elements belonging to Ki that satisfy a monic
polynomial f(x) with coefficients belonging to the integers, that is, elements
a ∈ Ki such that f(a) = 0.
It can be seen that OKi is a free Z-module with rank the degree of Ki
(when working with cyclotomic fields this degree is φ(mi)), and that its Z-basis
Bi = {b(i)1 , . . . , b(i)n } ⊂ OKi results to be a Q-basis for Ki and also a R-basis for
Ki
⊗
R.
We work with the result of the tensor product of the different rings of integers
which corresponds to each number field, that is, for the tensor of number fields
K(T ) =
⊗
i∈[l]Ki we consider the tensor ring of integers R =
⊗
i∈[l]OKi . All the
properties introduced for the ring of integers in [15] are also valid when working
with ideals of the new multivariate polynomial ring R.
Firstly, we could see R as a Z-module with rank n =
∏
i∈[l] φ(mi) and its
Z-basis would be
⊗
i∈[l]Bi ⊂ R that also results to be a Q-basis for K(T ) and a
R-basis for K(T ),R.
Next, we include some important facts about the ideals ofR. An integral ideal
(a.k.a. ideal) of R is an additive subgroup that is closed under multiplication by
R, that is, r · x ∈ I for any r ∈ R and x ∈ I. In order to generate an ideal I
of R, it can be shown that there exist two different elements g1, g2 ∈ R whose
R-linear combinations generate I = 〈g1, g2〉. An ideal is also a free Z-module of
rank n, so we have some basis {u1, . . . , un} ⊂ R.
The norm of an ideal is its corresponding index as an additive subgroup, that
is, N(I) = |R : I|. The sum I + J is also an ideal whose elements are all the
pairs x + y with x ∈ I and y ∈ J , the product ideal IJ is the set of all finite
sums of pairs xy with x ∈ I and y ∈ J . The norm of ideals generalizes the
previous definition of norm in the following way N(〈x〉) = |N(x)| with x ∈ R
and N(IJ ) = N(I)N(J ).
We say that two ideals I and J are coprime (or relatively prime) if I+J = R.
An ideal p ( R is prime if whenever ab ∈ p for some a, b ∈ R, then a ∈ p or
b ∈ p. An ideal p of R is prime if and only if it is maximal. The ring R has
unique factorization on ideals, that is, every ideal of R can be expressed as a
unique product of powers of prime ideals.
A fractional ideal I ⊂ K satisfies dI ⊆ R where dI is an integral ideal for
some d ∈ R. Its norm is defined as N(I) = N(dI)/|N(d)|.
Ideal Lattices This work relies on the lattices embedded by the fractional
ideals in K(T ) under the canonical embedding. Next, we describe some of their
properties. A fractional ideal I has a Z-basis U = {u1, . . . , un}. Then, under
the canonical embedding σ, the ideal yields a rank-n ideal lattice σ(I) with
basis {σ(u1), . . . , σ(un)} ⊂ H(T ). The lattice embedded by an ideal is commonly
identified by the ideal, so we consider the minimum distance λ1(I) of an ideal.
The absolute discriminant ∆K is defined for a field K. We generalize this
term to the tensor field K(T ), considering ∆K(T ) as the square of the fundamen-
tal volume of the embedded lattice σ(R). We also have ∆K(T ) = |det(Tr(bi ·bj))|,
where {b1, . . . , bn} is an integral basis of R. Therefore, we can define the funda-
mental volume of an ideal lattice σ(I) as N(I) ·√∆K(T ) .
Now we include an important lemma that gives upper and lower bounds on
the minimum distance of an ideal lattice.
Lemma 8 (Extended version of Lyubashevsky et al. [15] Lemma 2.9, Peikert
and Rosen [25] detailed proof). For any fractional ideal I in a tensor field K(T )
of degree n, and in any lp-norm for p ∈ [1,∞],
n1/p ·N(I)1/n
(a)
≤ λ1(I)
(b)
≤ n1/p ·N(I)1/n ·
√
∆
1/n
K(T )
. (6)
The proof of the previous Lemma 8 follows analogously to the proofs of the
Lemmas 6.1 (upper bound) and 6.2 (lower bound) in [25].
First, we start with the upper bound (b) following the guidelines of [25].
Considering ||x||p ≤ n1/p||x||∞ for x ∈ K(T ), we only need to prove the bound
for the p = ∞ norm. For this purpose, we resort to Minkowski’s Theorem 6 to
bound the distance of λ∞1 :
Theorem 6 (Minkowski’s Theorem). Let Λ be any lattice of rank n and B ⊆
span (Λ) be any convex body symmetric about the origin having n-dimensional
volume vol (B) > 2n · det (Λ). Then B contains some nonzero x ∈ Λ.
Now, we consider the n-dimensional closed C = {x ∈ H(T ) : ||x||∞ ≤ 1},
and each φ(mi)-dimensional closed C(i) = {x ∈ Hi : ||x||∞ ≤ 1}. Knowing that
Hi ⊆ Rs
(i)
1 × C2s(i)2 , it can be shown that the volume of C(i) is 2φ(mi) · (π/2)s
(i)
2 ,
where φ(mi) = s
(i)
1 + s
(i)
2 and finally being 2
n · (π/2)
∏
i∈[l] s
(i)
2 the volume of C.
Proceeding as in [25], we have for any β > N1/n (I)·
√
∆
1/n
K(T )
·(2/π)
∏
i∈[l] s
(i)
2 /n
vol (βC) = βnvol (C) > 2n ·N (I) ·
√
∆K(T ) = 2
n · det (σ (I)) ,
where by Minkowski’s Theorem 6, we know that βC contains a nonzero point of
σ (I), therefore λ∞1 ≤ β; consequently, it also satisfies the upper bound (b) of
Lemma 8.
Regarding the lower bound (a), we follow the steps of the proof for Lemma
6.2 in [25]. For 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, by the arithmetic mean/geometric mean inequality
we have:
||x||pp =
∑
i∈[n]
|σi (x) |p ≥ n ·

∏
i∈[n]
|σi (x) |p


1/n
= n · |N (x) |p/n,
where by applying the p-root in both sides, it yields the considered lower bound
(a) by considering that |N(x)| ≥ N (I) for any nonzero x ∈ I (for more details
of both proofs we refer the reader to [25]). Here, it is important to note that re-
sorting to the concepts presented in Appendix A.3, we can deal with the different
embeddings, even when we are working with the tensor of number fields.
Duality For any lattice L in K(T ) (this is the Z-span of any Q-basis of K(T )),
its dual is defined as:
L∨ = {x ∈ K(T ) : Tr(xL) ⊆ Z}. (7)
As in the “traditional” (non-tensor) number field case, using the canonical
embedding, L∨ embeds as the complex conjugate of the dual lattice, that is,
σ(L∨) = σ¯∗L. Taking this into account and considering also that L =
⊗
i∈[l] Li
and the dual operation commutes the tensoring, we have:
σ(L∨) = σ(⊗iL∨i ) = ⊗iσ(L∨i ) = ⊗iσ¯∗(Li)
= ⊗iσ∗(Li) = (⊗iσ(Li))∗ = σ∗(⊗iLi) = σ∗(L).
It is also easy to check that (L∨)∨ = L (tensoring commutes dual), and that
if L is a fractional ideal, its dual is also fractional. An important fact is that an
ideal and its inverse are related by multiplication with the dual ideal of the ring:
for any fractional ideal I, its dual ideal is I∨ = I−1 · R∨. The factor R∨ (often
called codifferent) is a fractional ideal whose inverse (R∨)−1, called the different
ideal, is integral and of norm N((R∨)−1) = ∆K(T ) , the discriminant of K(T ).
Ideal Lattice Problems We revise here the computational problems over
ideal lattices related to RLWE, and, by extension, to m-RLWE: the Shortest
Vector Problem (SVP), Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP), and the
Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) Problem. The three problems can be re-
stricted to the case of integral ideals over R (the tensor of ring of integers OKi),
analogously to the argument followed by Lyubashevsky et al. [16], [15] in the
non-tensor case: if I is a fractional ideal with denominator d ∈ R (such that
dI ⊆ R is a integral ideal), then the ideal N(d) · I ⊆ R, because N(d) ∈ 〈d〉.
Definition 7 (SVP and SIVP). Let K(T ) be a tensor of number fields endowed
with some geometric norm (e.g, the l2-norm), and let γ ≥ 1. The K(T )-SVPγ
problem in the given norm is posed as: given a fractional ideal I in K(T ), find
some nonzero x ∈ I such that ||x|| ≤ γ · λ1(I). The K(T )-SIVPγ problem is
defined similarly, where the goal is to find n linearly independent elements in I
whose norms are all at most γ · λn(I).
Definition 8 (BDD). Let K(T ) be a tensor of number fields endowed with some
geometric norm (e.g, the l2 norm), let I be a fractional ideal in K(T ), and let
d < λ1(I)/2. The K(T )-BDDI,d problem in the given norm is: given I and y of
the form y = x+ e for some x ∈ I and ||e|| ≤ d, find x.
Chinese Remainder Theorem We reformulate the Chinese Remainder The-
orem (CRT) for the ring R =
⊗
i∈[l]OKi in the tensor of number fields K(T ) =⊗
i∈[l]Ki and we also revisit some important concepts introduced in [15].
Lemma 9 (Chinese Remainder Theorem). Let I1, . . . , Ir be pairwise coprime
ideals in R, and let I = ∏i∈[r] Ii. The natural ring homomorphism R →⊕
i∈[r](R/Ii) induces a ring isomorphism R/I →
⊕
i∈[r](R/Ii).
The next lemma states that when this ring isomorphism exists, we can com-
pute a CRT basis C for the set of pairwise coprime ideals I1, . . . , Ir. The
basis is composed by elements c1, . . . , cr ∈ R that satisfy ci = 1 mod Ii and
ci = 0 mod Ij when i 6= j. We can use that basis in order to invert the CRT
isomorphism as follows: for any w = (w1, . . . , wr) ∈
⊕
i(R/Ii), we have that
v =
∑
iwi · ci mod I is the unique element in R/I that maps to w with that
ring isomorphism.
Lemma 10 (Efficient computable basis for isomorphism). There is a determin-
istic polynomial-time algorithm that, given coprime ideals I,J ⊆ R (represented
by Z-bases), outputs some c ∈ J such that c = 1 mod I. More generally, there
is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, given pairwise coprime ideals
I1, . . . , Ir, outputs a CRT basis c1, . . . , cr ∈ R for those ideals.
Now we include two more lemmas that allow us to efficiently compute a
bijection between the quotient groups I/qI and J /qJ for any fractional ideals
I,J . They are important for clearing out the arbitrary ideal I in the BDD-to-
LWE reduction. The lemmas are:
Lemma 11 (Lyubashevsky et al. [15] Lemma 2.14). Let I and J be ideals in
R. There exists t ∈ I such that the ideal t · I−1 ⊆ R is coprime to J . Moreover,
such t can be found efficiently given I and the prime ideal factorization of J .
Lemma 12 (Lyubashevsky et al. [15] Lemma 2.15). Let I and J be ideals in
R, let t ∈ I be such that t · I−1 is coprime with J , and let M be any fractional
ideal in K(T ). Then, the function θt : K(T ) → K(T ) defined as θt(u) = t · u
induces an isomorphism from M/JM to IM/IJM, as R-modules. Moreover,
this isomorphism may be efficiently inverted given I, J , M and t.
The proof of Lemma 12 for the case where K(T ) is a tensor of cylotomic fields
follows with the same techniques considered in [15], by taking into account that
θt induces a homomorphism of R-modules because it represents a multiplication
by a t ∈ R, so we do not include it here.
B Proof of Theorem 2
This appendix presents the proof of Theorem 2. It is based on the iterative use
of the following lemma:
Lemma 13 (Extended version of Lemma 4.2 Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). Let
α > 0 and q ≥ 2 be an integer. There exists an efficient quantum algorithm
that, given a fractional ideal I in K(T ), a number r ≥
√
2q · ηǫ(I) for some
negligible ǫ = ǫ(n) such that r′ = r · ω(√logn)/(αq) > √2n/λ1(I∨), an oracle
to m-R-LWEq,Ψ≤α , and a list of samples from the discrete Gaussian distribution
DI,r (as many as required by them-R-LWEq,Ψ≤α oracle), outputs an independent
sample from DI,r′.
Theorem 2 is proven as follows: we start with a value r ≥ 22nλn(I), in such
a way that we can classically generate any polynomial number of samples from
DI,r. Given the samples from DI,r, Lemma 13 can be used iteratively a polyno-
mial number of times (using the same samples) to obtain a polynomial number
of independent samples from DI,r′ with r′ = r/2 at each iteration. Repeating
this process, we can obtain samples from narrower and narrower distributions,
until we have samples from a distribution with parameter s ≥ γ.
Lemma 13 is obtained thanks to the following two results (Lemmas 14 and
15):
Lemma 14 (Extended version of Lemma 4.3 of Lyubashevsky et al. [15], proof
in Section 4.2). Let α > 0, let q ≥ 2 be an integer with known factorization,
let I be a fractional ideal in K(T ), and let r ≥
√
2q · ηǫ(I) for some negligible
ǫ = ǫ(n). Given an oracle for the discrete Gaussian distribution DI,r, there is a
probabilistic polynomial-time (classical) reduction from BDDI∨,d in the l∞ norm
to m-R-LWEq,Ψ≤α , where d = αq/(
√
2r).
Details for the proof of the lemma 14 follow the same steps of Lyubashevsky
et al. for Lemma 4.3 in [15], so we do not replicate it here. However, we have to
take into account that we are working with ideals over the tensor of the ring of
integers, so instead of considering the lemmas 2.14 and 2.15 from [15] we have
to use the redefined lemmas already presented in our work as Lemmas 11 and
12.
Lemma 15 (Extended version of Lemma 4.4 of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). There
is an efficient quantum algorithm that, given any n-dimensional lattice Λ, a num-
ber d′ < λ1(Λ∨)/2 (where λ1 is with respect to the l2 norm), and an oracle that
solves BDD on Λ∨ except with negligible probability for points whose offset from
Λ∨ is sampled from Dd′/√2n, outputs a sample from DΛ,√n/(√2d′). In particular,
since a sample from Dd′/
√
2n has l∞ norm at most d
′ ·ω(√logn)/√n except with
negligible probability, it suffices if the oracle solves BDDI∨,d in the l∞ norm,
where d = d′ · ω(√logn)/√n.
The sketch of the proof for the lemma 13 is the following: starting with sam-
ples from DI,r and an oracle for m-R-LWEq,Ψ≤α and resorting to the lemma 14
we can obtain an algorithm for BDD on I∨ to within distance d = αq/(√2r)
in the l∞ norm. Next, considering Lemma 15 with d′ = d
√
n/ω(
√
logn) =√
n/2/r′ < λ1(I∨)/2, we obtain a quantum procedure that outputs samples
from the discrete Gaussian distribution DI,r′.
C Proofs of Theorems 3, 4 and 5
This appendix includes the proofs for the main results involving the security
reductions of m-RLWE, as stated in Theorems 3, 4 and 5.
C.1 Search to Worst-Case Decision
Here we explain the two first reductions of the Theorems 3 and 4. Next, we in-
troduce the main definitions of the intermediate problems and the corresponding
lemmas, and we also highlight the differences due to working with the tensor of
the rings of integers.
Definition 9 (Extended version of the qi-LWEq,Ψ problem, Definition 5.4 from
Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). The qi-LWEq,Ψ problem is defined as: given access to
As,ψ for some arbitrary s ∈ R∨q and ψ ∈ Ψ , find s mod qiR∨.
Lemma 16 (LWE to qi-LWE, entending Lemma 5.5 of Lyubashevsky et al.
[15]). Suppose that the famility Ψ is closed under all the automorphisms of K(T )
(see Lemma 17), that is, ψ ∈ Ψ implies that τk(ψ) ∈ Ψ for all k ∈ [n]. Then,
for every i ∈ [n], there exists a deterministic polynomial-time reduction from
LWEq,Ψ to qi-LWEq,Ψ .
The proof is based on the fact that by having an oracle for qi-LWE and
resorting to the different field automorphisms, we can recover s modulo qjR
∨
for every j ∈ [n] and we can use the CRT for recovering s modulo R∨.
The reduction works in the following way: Let (a, b) ← As,ψ and apply an
automorphism (τk(a), τk(b)) that satisfies τk(qj) = qi. Now, we use the qi-LWE
oracle with the transformed samples and we apply the reverse automorphism
τk(t)
−1 ∈ R∨/qjR∨ to its output t ∈ R∨/qiR∨.
In order to see that τk(t)
−1
has the desired value s mod qjR
∨, we operate
with the pair (τk(a), τk(b)), with τk(b) = τk(a)·τk(s)/q+τk(e) mod R∨ where we
see that the pair follows the A
τk(s),τk(ψ) distribution (we know that τk(ψ) ∈ Ψ ,
see Lemma 17). Therefore, the oracle outputs t = τk(s) mod qiR
∨ and Lemma
16 is proven.
Lemma 17 (Extended version of Lemma 5.6 of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). For
any α > 0, the family Ψ≤α is closed under every automorphism τ of K(T ), that
is, ψ ∈ Ψ≤α implies that τ(ψ) ∈ Ψ≤α.
In order to see that for ψ ∈ Ψ any possible automorphism also belongs
to Ψ , we proceed as follows: each automorphism is the tensor of the existing
automorphisms for each cyclotomic field, that is, ⊗i∈[l]τ(i)ki with ki ∈ Z∗mi . Hence,
resorting to the definition of our error distributions (see Appendix A.2), we have
ψ = D⊗i∈[l]ri ∈ Ψ≤α where the elements of ⊗i∈[l]ri are bounded by α. As the
effect of the automorphism simply permutes the coordinates of each ri, we can
clearly see that ⊗j∈[l]τ(j)kj
(
D⊗i∈[l]ri
)
= D⊗i∈[l]r′i for kj ∈ Z∗j , which also belongs
to Ψ≤α because the value of the different elements follow being at most α (they
have only been permuted).
We now move on to Lemma 18 for the second reduction of the proof, but we
first introduce two definitions for the intermediate problems:
Definition 10 (Extended Hybrid LWE Distribution of Lyubashvesky et al.[15]).
For j ∈ [n], s ∈ R∨q , and a distribution ψ over K(T ),R, the distribution Ajs,ψ over
Rq ×T is defined as follows: choose (a, b)← As,ψ and output (a, b+ h/q) where
h ∈ R∨q is uniformly random and independent modulo qiR∨ for all i ≤ j, and is
equal to zero modulo all the remaining qiR
∨. We also define A0s,ψ = As,ψ.
Definition 11 (Extended WDLWEjq,Ψ (Worst-Case Decision LWE Relative to
qj) of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). For j ∈ [n] and a family of distributions Ψ ,
the WDLWEjq,Ψ problem is defined as follows: given access to A
i
s,ψ for arbitrary
s ∈ R∨q , ψ ∈ Ψ , and i ∈ {j − 1, j}, find i.
Lemma 18 (Extended version of Search to Decision of Lyubashvesky et al.
[15]). For any j ∈ [n], there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time reduction
from qj-LWEq,Ψ to WDLWE
j
q,Ψ .
The proof of the reduction is based on trying each of the different possible
values of s modulo qjR
∨ in such a way that after modifying the samples from
Aq,ψ , we have that a) for the correct value, the samples are distributed following
Aj−1q,ψ and b) for the rest of possible values, they follow A
j
q,ψ .
We can try all different values for s mod qjR
∨ because the norm of qj for all j
satisfies N(qj) = q = poly(n), so we can enumerate all the combinations. Finally,
we can use the oracle WDLWEjq,Ψ for distinguishing between the distributions
Aj−1q,ψ and A
j
q,ψ .
Following an analogous procedure as the one in [15], given a sample (a, b)←
As,ψ , we have:
(a′, b′) = (a+ v, b+ (h+ vg)/q) ∈ Rq × T,
where v ∈ Rq satisfies that it is uniformly random modulo qj and zero modulo
other different prime ideal, h, g ∈ R∨q , where h is uniformly random and inde-
pendent modulo any qiR
∨ when i < j, and it is zero for the rest of possible
values of i. Finally, we have:
b′ = (a′s+ h+ v(g − s))/q + e,
with e← ψ.
Now, choosing different values for g we have the following results: a) if g =
s mod qjR
∨, the distribution of (a′, b′) is Aj−1s,ψ , and b) if g 6= s mod qjR∨, the
distribution of (a′, b′) is Ajs,ψ. Hence, we only have to enumerate different g
values which satisfy different conditions modulo qjR
∨ (the values modulo other
qiR
∨ with i 6= j are not important) to achieve the reduction.
C.2 Worst-Case Decision to Average-Case Decision
The objective of this part is to cover the two last reductions of Theorems 3 and
4. For this purpose, we present some definitions and lemmas that allow us to
reduce the worst-case decision WDLWEjq,Ψ problem to an average-case problem
DLWEq,Υ where the goal is to distinguish between As,ψ and uniform samples
where the parameters of the error distribution are also secret and drawn from
Υ .
Definition 12 (Extended version of Average-Case Decision LWE Relative to qj
(DLWEjq,Υ ) of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). For j ∈ [n] and a distribution Υ over
error distributions, we say that an algorithm solves the DLWEjq,Υ problem if with
a non negligible probability over the choice of a random (s, ψ) ← U(R∨q ) × Υ ,
it has a non negligible difference in acceptance probability on inputs from Ajs,ψ
versus inputs from Aj−1s,ψ .
Lemma 19 (Extended version of Worst-Case to Average-Case Lemma 5.12 of
Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). For any α > 0 and every j ∈ [n], there is a randomized
polynomial-time reduction from WDLWEj1,Ψ≤α to DLWE
j
q,Υα
.
In order to prove the previous lemma, let s′ ∈ R∨q , r′ ∈ (R+)n, k ∈ [n], and
the pair (a, b), and consider the transformation (a, b+ (a · s′ + h)/q + e′) where
e′ is drawn from Dr′ , h ∈ R∨q and h satisfies that h mod qiR∨ are uniformly
random and independent for i ≤ k, and zero for all other i. Then, when the
input is Ajs,ψ, this transformation outputs A
max {k,j}
s+s′,ψ+D
r
′
.
Now, to achieve the reduction, we repeat the following process a polynomial
number of times: we draw s′ ∈ R∨q , and we have r′ ∈ (R+)n where r′ =
⊗
i∈[l] r
′
i
(as it was presented in Appendix A.2) and r′i,j = r
′
i,j+φ(mi)/2
with i ∈ [l] and j ∈
[φ(mi)]. We also have r
′2
j = α
2
√
nxj and r
′2
i = α
2
√
nxi for all j, i ∈ [n] and where
the xj and xi are chosen independently from Γ (2, 1) if rj and ri are different.
Next, we estimate the acceptance probability of the oracle for two different
input distributions: a) applying to the input the previous transformation with
parameters s′, r′ and j−1; b) applying to the input the previous transformation
with parameters s′, r′ and j. Finally, after a polynomial number of repetitions
we output j−1 if there is a non negligible difference between the two acceptance
probabilities; on the contrary, we output j.
Let us assume that the input distribution is Aj−1q,Dr for some r where all
ri ∈ [0, α] for i ∈ [n]. Then, we have to estimate the acceptance probability of
the oracle on Aj−1s+s′,Dr+Dr′ and A
j
s+s′,Dr+Dr′
, and we notice thatDr+Dr′ = Dr′′
where r′′2i = r
′2
i +r
2
i . If we denote by S the set of pairs (s, ψ) for which the oracle
has non negligible difference in acceptance probability between Aj−1q,ψ and A
j
q,ψ ,
we have by assumption (the measure of S under U(R∨q ) × Υα is non negligible)
and by claim C.2 below that (s+s′, Dr+Dr′) ∈ S with non negligible probability,
and the proof of Lemma 19 is complete.
Our Claim C.2 a variant of the Claim 5.11 presented by Lyubashevsky et al.
[15]. For our case, we need a similar result, but it must hold not only for inde-
pendent variables following a Γ (2, 1) distribution, because in our more general
case, for i ∈ [n] we can have that more than two xi are equal. Therefore, we
present a modification for vectors of coefficients distributed as Γ (2, 1), where
they do not have to be independent, and we justify its validity.
Claim (Extended Claim 5.11 from [15]). Let P be the distribution Γ (2, 1)n
and Q be the distribution (Γ (2, 1)− z1) × · · · × (Γ (2, 1)− zn) for some 0 ≤
z1, . . . , zn ≤ 1/
√
n where the different Γ (2, 1) of both P and Q do not have
to be independent and some of them can be equal to each other. Then, any set
A ⊆ Rn whose measure under P is non negligible also has non negligible measure
under Q.
The proof of the claim follows the next scheme: first, let P,Q : Rn → R+,
where when Q(x) = 0 we also have P (x) = 0, and we define R (P ||Q) =∫
Rn
P (x)2
Q(x) dx, considering that the fraction is zero when both the numerator and
the denominator are zero. By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have for any non
empty set A ⊆ Rn,
(∫
A P (x)dx
)2
∫
A
Q(x)dx
≤
∫
A
P (x)2
Q(x)
dx ≤ R (P ||Q) .
Thus, if we have a set A with non negligible measure under P and R (P ||Q) ≤
poly(n) holds, we can say that the set A has non negligible measure under Q.
For the particular setting of the Claim C.2, when z > 0 we have
R (Γ (2, 1)||Γ (2, 1)− z) = ez
(
1− z + z2ez
∫ ∞
z
x−1e−xdx
)
,
and when z is small, this expression reduces to 1 + z2 log (1/z) +O(z2).
The difference regarding the proof of [15] relies on the following fact: if we
compute R (P ||Q), we have:
R (Γ (2, 1)
n|| (Γ (2, 1)− z1 × · · · × Γ (2, 1)− zn))
≤ R (Γ (2, 1)||Γ (2, 1)− z1) . . . R (Γ (2, 1)||Γ (2, 1)− zn) ,
where the equality is achieved when all the components of each vector are in-
dependent. When some of the Γ (2, 1) variables are equal, we can see that the
ratio of the corresponding distributions is equal to the ratio of only one of the
variables of P and Q respectively.
Now, as we know that the second term of the expression is bounded by
poly(n), the claim is proven because for the setting of the claim our expression
is bounded by the second term.
Lemma 20 (Extended version of Lemma 5.14 Hybrid by Lyubashevsky et al.
[15]). Let Υ be a distribution over noise distributions satisfying that for any ψ in
the support of Υ and any s ∈ R∨q , the distribution Ans,ψ is within negligible statis-
tical distance from uniform. Then for any oracle solving the DLWEq,Υ problem,
there exists a j ∈ [n] and an efficient algorithm that solves DLWEjq,Υ using the
oracle.
The proof works as follows: consider a pair (s, ψ) for which the oracle can dis-
tinguish between As,ψ and uniform distribution with a non negligible advantage.
By Markov’s inequality, the probability measure of those pairs is non negligible.
Knowing that A0s,ψ = As,ψ and that A
n
s,ψ is negligibly far from the uniform
distribution (see Lemma 21), we see that for each (s, ψ) we must have a j ∈ [n]
for which the oracle distinguishes between Ajq,ψ and A
j−1
q,ψ with non negligible
advantage. Finally, the lemma is proven if we take the j that is associated to the
set of pairs (s, ψ) with the highest probability. With the proof of this lemma,
the proof of the Theorem 3 is complete.
Lemma 21 (Adapted version of lemma 5.13 of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]). Let
α ≥ ηǫ(R∨)/q for some ǫ > 0. Then, for any ψ in the support of Υα and s ∈ R∨q ,
the distribution Ans,ψ is within statistical distance ǫ/2 of the uniform distribution
over (Rq,T).
The proof of this lemma is obtained by following the steps in [15] and taking
into account the considered changes in our setting together with our Lemma 5.
Finally, we introduce the needed lemma for the reductions of Theorem 4.
Lemma 22 (Extended version of Lemma 5.16 of Lyubashevsky et al. [15]
Worst-Case to Average-Case with Spherical Noise). For any α > 0, l ≥ 1,
and every j ∈ [n], there exists a randomized polynomial-time reduction from
solving WDLWEjq,Ψ≤α to solving DLWE
j
q,Dξ
given only l samples, where ξ =
α(nl/ log (nl))1/4.
In order to prove the Lemma 22, we consider the transformation that we have
already used for the proof of the Lemma 19, but in this case the transformation
has l different inputs. So, let s′ ∈ R∨q , k ∈ [n], and ei ∈ T for i ∈ [l]. Now, consider
for the following l samples (ai, bi) the mentioned transformation (ai, bi + (ai ·
s′ + hi)/q + ei), where hi ∈ R∨q and i ∈ [l]. It is important to note that all the
hi satisfy that they are independent and uniform modulo qdR
∨ for all d ≤ k,
and they are zero when d does not satisfy the previous relation. Therefore, if we
take l independent inputs drawn from Ajq,ψ and we apply the transformation to
all of them considering that all ei are independently drawn from Dr′ , we have
as output distribution
(
A
max {k,j}
s+s′,ψ+D
r
′
)l
.
Now, the reduction repeats the following process a polynomial number of
times: we consider s′ ∈ R∨q and a set of independent ei drawn from Dξ. Next, we
estimate the acceptance probability of the oracle for two different input distri-
butions: a) applying to the input the previous transformation with parameters
s′, ei and j − 1; b) applying to the input the previous transformation with pa-
rameters s′, ei and j. After a polynomial number of repetitions, we output j− 1
whenever a non negligible difference between the two acceptance probabilities is
observed; otherwise, we output j.
Assuming the input distribution is Aj−1s,Dr , where all the coefficients of r are
in [0, α] for the two previous cases, we have two different output distributions:(
Aj−1s+s′,ψ+D
r
′
)l
and
(
Ajs+s′,ψ+D
r
′
)l
. We also consider that the coefficients of r′
verify r′2i = ξ
2 − r2i , so we have Dr +Dr′ = Dξ.
As with Lemma 19, let S be the set of all tuples (s, e1, . . . , el) for which the
oracle has a non negligible difference in acceptance probability on
(
Aj−1s+s′,ψ+D
r
′
)l
and
(
Ajs+s′,ψ+D
r
′
)l
. By our assumption and a Markov argument, the measure
of S under U
(
R∨q
)× (Dr′)l is non negligible, and we have
1 ≤ ξ√
ξ2 − r2i
≤ ξ√
ξ2 − α2
≤ 1 +
√
log (nl)
nl
,
where thanks to the Claim C.2 below, we can assert that S is also non negligible
under U
(
R∨q
)×(Dξ)l, and where we can derive the condition ξ = α(nl/ log (nl))1/4,
hence completing the proof of the Lemma 22 and the Theorem 4.
Claim (Claim 5.15 from [15]). Let r1, . . . , rn ∈ R+ and s1, . . . , sn ∈ R+ be such
that for all i, |si/ri − 1| <
√
(logn) /n. Then any set A ⊆ Rn whose measure
under the Gaussian distribution Dr1 × · · · ×Drn is non negligible, also has non
negligible measure under Ds1 × · · · ×Dsn .
